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Farine (2020) has provided a clearly written and nicely argued investigation into the interrelated
phenomena of democracy, deliberation, and the norms for public arguing. She displayed deep
involvement with advanced work in the areas of political theory, philosophy, and argumentation.
In fact, her grasp of that work far exceeds my own. It might be best to remind readers that I am
“commenting,” not critiquing or evaluating. I think it is a fine essay, but I recognize I need to
leave many of her theses to others who have more background in her literatures.
Instead, by way of commentary, I want to raise a couple of points that may be worth thinking
about. They are stimulated by Farine’s engagement with the idea that {true} democracy must be
founded upon {genuine} deliberation, so that both democracy and deliberation emerge from the
same essential set of norms. Democracy is deliberative, and deliberation is democratic.
Therefore, whatever is necessary for one to proceed properly is also necessary for the other. She
introduces this general idea early in the paper, when she says “the issue is not so much the
legitimacy of governments as the legitimacy of governance: the problem is not located in
democratic systems per se, but in how to achieve democratic ideals through the exercise of
legislative and/or executive power” (p. 2). Deliberation is how the ideals are achieved (or not),
and their degree of achievement is itself a reflection of how good the public deliberation was.
The main thought I would like to pursue here has to do with the norms for ideal arguing. Farine
has concentrated on norms for public arguing, but there is quite a bit of parallel work for
interpersonal arguing. The norms seem similar. I then want to explore whether the same norms
ought to be operative for intrapersonal arguing, in private and without a real partner.
Before doing that, however, I would like to soften the ground a bit by discussing the
interpenetration of the public and personal spheres of argument and life. We all know
Goodnight’s (1982) distinctions among the public, technical, and public spheres. These spheres
contain simple interpersonal exchanges, scholarly developments, and social/government policy
issues. Even in Goodnight’s own worked example (pp. 217-219) we see how a simple
interpersonal exchange can be imagined to elevate into a scholarly one, and then could even be
projected into a matter for public legislation. From the start of the spheres idea, then, we have
noticed that the same themes can appear in any of the spheres, and that the content of one sphere
can influence or reflect another.
Goodnight’s example (an amusing one about people getting politicized by adherence to Willard’s
argumentation theories) runs in the direction of personal to public, but the other influence route
is also simple to understand. The 2016 election in the US, clearly a matter for the public sphere,
has intruded into families, friendships, and marriages (e.g., Johnson et al.,2019). Some families
will not talk about politics any more, and some relationships have been endangered by it. This

possibility was anticipated and exemplified in Johnson, Hample, and Cionea (2014), who
mentioned an example of a marriage dissolving because one partner spent nearly all her time
protesting US military engagement in the Middle East. Sahlstein Parcell (2019) has shown how
public matters can slide easily into interpersonal relationships, and Soliz (2019) has discussed
how one’s personal sense of identity can become conflicted by public expectations for what
one’s identity is supposed to be. Public sphere matters easily leak into personal life, and the
main trigger for this is nothing more than genuine engagement with the issues. Democratic
deliberation can also be private or interpersonal arguing.
So if the arguments can creep easily from one sphere to another, do they take their norms with
them? You and I have reason to pause over this question, because Walton (1998) has clearly
explained to us that an argument that is legitimate in one sort of dialogue can be a fallacy in
another. Do spheres work the same way? This may turn out to be quite an important question,
and I don’t have a decisive answer here. But I can point out that we seem to have made the
assumption that the norms pass as easily among spheres as the issues do.
Farine set me to thinking about this. A central focus in her paper is “epistemic parity,” which she
treats as fundamental to both democracy and deliberation, at their best. Epistemic parity requires
political equality, and she borrows from Dahl (2006, p. 9) to detail the requirements for both:
1. « Effective participation »: all citizens must have the right to participate in public
deliberations on a policy.
2. « Equality in voting »: all citizens must have the right to participate in vote on the
adoption of a policy.
3. « Gaining enlightened understanding »: all citizens must have access to
information about the new policy and alternative possibilities.
4. « Final control of the agenda »: all citizens must have the right to propose new
policies for debate and voting at any time, and to question previously adopted
policies.
5. « Fundamental rights »: each of these features is a fundamental right.
Equal right to deliberate, equal right to vote, equal access to pertinent information, equal right to
design the deliberation agenda, and widespread recognition that these are all fundamental rights
– these are the foundations of democracy and public deliberation.
In my preparation for this commentary, I happened to encounter some thoughts by Dutwin
(2003) that are similar. Dutwin says that effective deliberation requires three things: that the
decisions follow from the deliberation (he calls this “nontyranny”), that the public be able to
view and experience the deliberation, and that the participants are viewed as being equals and
allowed to participate on equal footing.
Farine, Dahl, and Dutwin are all obviously thinking about the public sphere. But I wasn’t. I was
thinking how similar these prescriptions are to things I had read about face to face arguing.
Ehninger (1970) explained that the virtues of debating rely on participants being “restrained
partisans,” who pursue their genuine aims but in a fair-minded way. Johnstone (1982) described
true dialectical arguing as being “bilateral,” such that each participant regards the other with such

respect that both experience all the argumentation from both people’s point of view, and neither
will accept a solution that does not genuinely reflect both arguers’ interests. Habermas described
an ideal speech situation (Burleson & Kline, 1979) that requires a list of affordances similar to
Dahl’s: all parties have equal rights to the floor, have equal resources, and power inequalities
must be erased or suspended. In pragma-dialectics, second- and third-order conditions have been
set out, and these roughly parallel the main concerns I have just enumerated (van Eemeren,
Grootendorst et al., 1993).
So these norms of equality and epistemic parity that Farine posited for public deliberation seem
to be very similar, if not identical, to those laid out for the best dialectic, interpersonal exchange,
and critical discussion. Without, as far as I know, explicitly addressing the question of whether
public and personal arguing have the same normative requirements, we all seem to have
generated theory that says the norms are the same. This is very interesting – that we should
discipline a whole nation in the same way that two friends would discipline one another.
I cannot help wondering whether the same norms also apply to individual reflection – arguing
alone, working through a problem by one’s self. Some of the norms just seem odd in this
context. Exactly who is supposed to be equal to whomever else? Exactly who are these agents
who need equal access to information, and equal standing in the view of, well, who exactly? An
individual arguing alone needs to be open-minded, of course, but isn’t that almost necessarily
entailed when we say that someone is arguing intrapersonally? Considerations of politeness,
social standing, knowledge, ability, civility, and right of expression all seem to fall away as soon
as we leave any sort of social context. We are left with the issues of argument strength, cogency,
validity, acceptability-relevance-sufficiency, and so forth.
That is familiar news to this audience, of course. But we have an interesting contrast in our
literatures: When we consider one person, we naturally raise up informal logic as the source of
our norms. But when we think of deliberative democracy, we immediately turn our attention to
the social issues that we know can wreck public argument, and often concentrate on those. At a
minimum, I think it would be a good idea to produce a genuine integration of these two families
of norms, rather than merely mentioning the importance of tight warrants and then returning to
topics such as tyranny and dominance.
Farine’s paper had more scope than these reactions I have conveyed, but I felt that her paper was
stimulating in many respects. I warmly recommend it to you.
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